Do parties that represent ethnic minorities tend to exclude women? There are several reasons to think that this may be the case. First, the comparatively smaller size of ethnic parties could exclude women, especially under proportional representation. Second, the subcultures of many ethnic minorities are often more patriarchal than the majority culture, and thus parties representing such groups may include fewer women. Finally, an ideological fixation on ethnicity within ethnic parties may marginalize submi norities within the target group. Using a new crossnational data set, the authors examine the degree to which ethnic parties represent women, controlling for party size, electoral systems, gender quotas, ideology, and democratic development. Findings show that ethnic parties, particularly those appealing to a religious minority, tend to elect fewer women, but only under proportional representation electoral systems. Keywords women's representation, ethnic parties, intersectionality, electoral systems Do parties that explicitly represent ethnic minorities (referred to here as ethnic parties) tend to exclude women? There are good reasons to presume that this may be the case. Scholarship on intersectionality-the intersection
of gender and ethnicity in politics-has hinted at the differences and tensions that may be involved in the representation of women and ethnic minorities (Dovi, 2002; Hughes, 2007) . Despite shared grievances of exclusion, historically marginalized groups may come into conflict when faced with the trade-off entailed in competition over scarce political commodities such as electoral office (see Dowd, 2008; Leibovich, 2008) . We might therefore anticipate tension rather than cooperation between ethnic minorities and women in the electoral realm. Furthermore, the mechanism by which women and ethnic minorities are elected may be sufficiently different and at odds so that the achievement of one comes at the expense of the other (Moser & Holmsten, 2008) . Finally, the protection of group rights embedded in multiculturalism may promote patriarchal practices that lead to the exclusion of women (Okin, 1999) . However, we have little systematic empirical evidence to verify claims that female and minority representation may come into conflict or to explain the mechanisms underlying this dynamic.
In this article, therefore, we aim to systematically test whether parties targeting ethnic minorities elect fewer women and to identify what factors might drive the relationship between ethnic minority parties and the election of women. Using a unique data set, we compare patterns of female representation across 260 parties from 21 countries with an eye toward uncovering the extent to which ethnic parties elect women compared to other types of parties. We control for factors that are commonly suspected to explain variation in the election of women more generally, including party size, electoral system, and gender quotas. Moreover, we examine variation among ethnic minority parties to see if certain types of ethnic parties are more (or less) favorable to the election of women. We find that religious ethnic parties are significantly less likely to elect women than other ethnic parties based on region, linguistics, or ethnicity. This effect, however, is present only under proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. Our findings have important implications for how gender and ethnicity intersect in democratic politics and how institutions affect these phenomena.
The Tension Between Ethnic Minorities and the Election of Women
Ethnic parties are viewed as the primary vehicle for the representation of ethnic minorities in national legislatures (Lijphart, 2004; Norris, 2004) . Following Chandra (2005) , we define ethnic parties as parties that appeal "to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and makes such an appeal central to its mobilizing strategy" (p. 236). The existence of such parties has been a consistent and significant fixture in competitive elections, especially in ethnically divided societies. We concentrate here on ethnic minority parties (e.g., as opposed to nationalist parties of ethnic majorities) because it is these parties that present polities with the dilemma of descriptive representation with which we are concerned: the effort to simultaneously increase the representation of historically marginalized people. Thus, only parties that appeal to ethnic minorities are considered to be "ethnic parties" for the purposes of this article. 1 In this article, we highlight a potential dilemma of descriptive representation that has received relatively little attention from scholars focused on the election of women or minorities, namely, the potential negative effects that increased representation of one historically marginalized group may have on the inclusion of other excluded groups. As the scholarship on intersectionality demonstrates, ethnic parties may undermine the election of women in direct and indirect ways. Most directly, there may be fundamental philosophical differences in how the two social categories view their role in society and the means through which they stand to gain greater political integration (Okin, 1999) . Multiculturalism espouses the value of group representation for equality, justice, and the exercise of deliberative democracy (Young, 2002) . However, as Okin (1999) argued, the emphasis on group rights within multiculturalism may undermine equality for women, especially when ethnic minorities are patriarchal. Therefore, under the shield of group rights, certain patriarchal minority groups can appeal to culture to defend discrimination, exclusion, and even violence against women. In short, the value of group rights inherent in multiculturalism potentially conflicts with efforts to increase gender equality. Again quoting Okin, "It is by no means clear, then, from a feminist point of view, that minority group rights are part of the solution. They may well exacerbate the problem" (p. 22).
Ethnic parties may undermine women's representation in less direct ways as well. Inequalities are framed by particular social and political processes that in turn determine the political strategy for representation (Verloo, 2006) . Krook and O'Brien (2007) explored the factors that influence how particular identities emerge and seek political representation, and they suggested that attention to certain groups is determined by a political process that can put different groups at odds with each other. And when ethnicity and gender are in conflict, one identity may become primary over another. Studies of African American voters in the United States, for example, have suggested that race "trumps" gender, as African American women vote for coethnics over other women (Hardy-Fanta, Lien, Sierra, & Pinderhughes, 2007, p. 29) .
Similarly, Goetz (1998, p. 244) observed that in Uganda social cleavages around ethnicity and religion leave "little space" for gender. As a result, ethnic groups with access to only a few seats in the legislature may exclusively focus on placing coethnics and be less likely to pay attention to gender balance. In short, there is a potential for competition between groups suffering from different inequalities.
In addition, remedies to address inequalities, such as the promotion of ethnic parties, are not necessarily neutral to efforts to address other forms of inequality such as gender (Verloo, 2006) . Thus, the barriers to descriptive representation are different for women and ethnic minorities, as are the political remedies to increase representation. For example, Htun (2004) has shown that special provisions promoting the election of women have tended to emphasize quotas within mainstream parties, whereas attempts to foster the representation of ethnic minorities tend to focus on reserved seats outside conventional electoral competition and mainstream parties.
Although some studies, particularly the works noted above on intersectionality, have acknowledged the tensions inherent in representing women and ethnic minorities, the vast literature on female and minority representation has largely ignored this question. This is particularly true of the institutional approach that has focused on the impact of electoral systems and specific electoral rules such as gender quotas, reserved seats, and minoritymajority districts on descriptive representation. Such scholarship almost universally has examined female or minority representation in isolation from the other.
2 As a result, many scholars assume that the causal mechanisms for the election of ethnic minorities apply to the election of women, and visa versa.
Arend Lijphart (2004) , for example, argued that "the beauty of PR is that in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups-ethnic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups-in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion" (pp. 99-100). Similarly, Caul (1999) suggested that in her study of the election of women the "same partylevel characteristics that are conducive to women's representation may also help other traditionally under-represented groups, such as ethnic minorities and environmentalists" (p. 94). Matland and Taylor (1997) concluded their study similarly, indicating that although their study of electoral system effects focused on women, their argument applied to other marginalized groups as well. The institutional arguments for increased representation of women and minorities become arguments about social equality, without delineating ethnicity from gender and assuming a fusion of means for the achievement of greater equality for both groups.
This study fills important gaps in the literature on intersectionality and descriptive representation more generally. Contributing to work on intersectionality, we seek to provide a more systematic empirical analysis of claims that the protection of group rights for ethnic minorities through ethnic parties may inhibit the promotion of female representation and to extend this scholarship beyond its current focus on the representation of minority women. In the case of scholarship on the descriptive representation of women and minorities, we aim to demonstrate that women's representation and minority representation do not necessarily operate by the same logic and processes. Indeed, as this study shows, a central paradox of descriptive representation is that gains in political inclusion for one excluded group may come at another's expense.
Data
We test the relationship between ethnic parties and the election of women with a data set of individual legislators aggregated into political parties. For our dependent variable, we use two indicators of the level of women's representation in each party: (a) the percentage of a party's seats in the legislature that are held by women (0%-100%) and (b) a dichotomous variable indicating whether women hold any of the party's legislative seats (1 = no seats held by women, 0 = at least one woman holds a seat). Each measure captures a unique but related aspect of women's representation. The first reflects the degree of women's representation in a party, whereas the second indicates whether the party excludes women entirely.
Of course, to construct our data set, we had to determine gender and party affiliation of thousands of individual legislators. We collected this information from the Web sites of national legislatures and central electoral commissions, determining gender through either photographs or personal pronouns (he, she) used to describe deputies. Unfortunately, data on the gender and party affiliations of individual legislators are not always readily available. Despite these difficulties, we were able to construct an extensive data set covering 260 political parties in 21 countries. Our country cases come primarily from Eastern and Western Europe; in addition to these countries, we were also able to collect the relevant information on parties from India, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Canada. 3 All data pertain to the most recent election in each country. Every country included in the data set has at least one ethnic party that won at least one seat in the legislature in the most recent election. Within each country, every party that won at least one seat in the legislature for the same election was included.
We used a variety of sources to code the character of parties, including Europa World Yearbook, election reports in Electoral Studies, Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum (2001) , and party Web sites. Parties were determined to be ethnic parties if (a) they included a particular ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional group in their name or (b) were deemed to make appeals to specific ethnic minorities by one or more of the sources named above. We also coded ethnic parties based on the nature of the ethnic cleavage of the target group. So ethnic parties were further subdivided into religious, linguistic, regional, and ethnic parties. Following Chandra and Wilkinson's (2008) assertion that ethnicity is multidimensional in nature, we did not restrict each party to a single ethnic cleavage. Thus, a party that targeted a group that had both a linguistic and a regional identity (e.g., the French-speaking Quebecois) was coded as both a linguistic and a regional party. 4 We categorize nonethnic parties into ideological categories based on a left-right scale (left, center-left, center-right, right), with an additional category for green parties, which have been shown to be particularly women friendly (Caul, 1999; Kolinsky, 1988) . As noted above, nationalist parties appealing to the majority ethnic group were coded as right-wing parties not ethnic parties. Data on the electoral system of each country were collected from the Inter-Parliamentary Union Web site, and information on gender quotas was collected from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Web site on gender quotas.
Descriptive Analysis
In this section, we present a number of descriptive analyses that show the extent to which ethnic parties elect women compared to nonethnic parties under different electoral and political conditions. We use both indicators of women's representation in a given party: the percentage of deputies who are women and a dichotomous variable indicating whether women are excluded altogether or not. Throughout the discussion, we highlight potential explanations for ethnic parties' apparent weak representation of women and explore their plausibility to the extent possible with descriptive analyses. We then build on these ideas using multivariate analysis in the section that follows. Table 1 shows the breakdown of women's representation within ethnic versus nonethnic parties in general and subsets within the two categories based on party size, electoral system, and whether parties are subject to gender quotas. Table 2 shows differences of means and proportions for key comparisons between ethnic and nonethnic parties. From Table 2 , we see that ethnic parties indeed differ from other parties in women's representation.
Nonethnic parties, on average, elected 3.5% more women than ethnic parties, and this difference was statistically significant at the .1 level. Moreover, the percentage of ethnic parties that elect no women at all was more than twice the percentage of nonethnic parties electing no women, shown in Table 1 , and this difference was statistically significant at the .01 level.
Party Size
The first factor that may influence ethnic parties' propensity to elect women is party size. Ethnic parties are, on average, more than 4 times smaller than nonethnic parties (averaging 6 deputies vs. 27 deputies, respectively). The literature on party size suggests a positive correlation between the size of a party and the election of women, particularly in PR electoral systems where larger parties should be able to elect representatives from further down on their party lists. 5 Female candidates tend to occupy lower positions on party lists, and thus when a party pulls candidates from deeper in its lists, women have a greater likelihood of winning a seat. 6 Thus, ethnic parties may elect fewer women than nonethnic parties simply because the former tend to be much smaller than the latter.
For the purposes of exploring differences in women's representation across parties according to size, we compared parties with three or fewer deputies ("smaller" parties) to parties with four or more deputies ("larger" parties). Two interesting patterns emerge. First, in terms of the average percentage of women elected, smaller parties elect significantly fewer female deputies among nonethnic parties whereas party size seems to have much less impact among ethnic parties. Larger ethnic parties elect only 1.7% more women than do smaller ethnic parties, whereas larger nonethnic parties elect 6.0% more women than do smaller nonethnic parties. However, in terms of the total exclusion of women, small parties tend to elect no women at a much higher rate than do large parties for both ethnic and nonethnic parties. These patterns suggest that although party size might account for part of ethnic parties' limited women representation, it is not the whole story; there is something else about being an ethnic party-other than small party status-that inhibits the election of women. 
Electoral System
It is a common assumption that PR systems elect more women than do singlemember-district (SMD) systems. Numerous studies have established the central role that PR electoral systems play in facilitating female representation even after controlling for other factors such as socioeconomic conditions and culture (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Norris, 1985 Norris, , 2004 Reynolds, 1999) . PR systems enhance the capability of parties to consider gender in their nomination strategy by allowing parties greater control over nominations, producing greater legislator turnover and producing greater incentives for gender balance in nominations. Because all nominations are centralized on single party lists for each multimember district, a lack of female candidates is easily apparent, can be perceived as discrimination, and thus may be an electoral liability. In fact, the notion of a "balanced" set of candidates is practical only if the list of candidates is presented in its entirety to the electorate (see Norris, 2004, pp. 188-189) .
There is at least one reason, however, to suspect that PR systems do not have the same effect for ethnic and nonethnic parties. If one of the reasons PR is conducive to the election of women is its relatively centralized nomination procedures, it stands to reason that certain parties-those with ideological or political reasons to favor women, such as left-leaning parties-may see a greater number of women elected than parties without such proclivities. One type of party that may hinder rather than promote women's representation under PR because of the more centralized nature of nominations may be ethnic parties, especially those that represent groups with a patriarchal culture. Table 1 reports the degree of women's representation in ethnic and nonethnic parties under different electoral systems (PR, SMD, and mixed), and Table 2 presents the differences for the relevant comparisons.
We find strong evidence that the effect of PR systems is not constant across ethnic and nonethnic parties alike. Indeed, PR seems to increase women's representation for nonethnic parties but fails to do so for ethnic parties. As Table 1 reports, women's representation is much higher among nonethnic parties in PR systems (22%) as opposed to SMD systems (12%), and this difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. PR systems do not, however, have this effect for ethnic parties. Electoral system seems to make little or no difference for women's representation among ethnic parties. Indeed, in our sample, ethnic parties actually elected slightly more women under SMD systems (16%) than under PR systems (15%), but this difference is not statistically significant (see Table 2 ). Finally, this pattern continues when we compare ethnic and nonethnic parties to each other within a given electoral system. Under PR, nonethnic parties elect 7% more women than ethnic parties, a difference that is statistically significant at the .05 level, but under SMD systems nonethnic parties actually elect, on average, fewer women than ethnic parties, although the difference is not statistically significant.
8

Gender Quotas
Gender quotas have been one of the most celebrated and controversial institutional remedies for the election of women. Quotas come in the form of party commitments or national mandates, and some include placement requirements. Any such rule should increase the election of women. Quotas serve as a "fast track" for women candidates to be elected, particularly in new democracies where the alternative may be to wait for long-term social change to promote women into positions of power (Bauer, 2007; Dahlerup & Freidenval, 2005; Larserud & Taphorn, 2007) . Krook and others have demonstrated that there are mitigating factors that may weaken the positive effect of quotas on women (Bird, 2003; Krook, 2003) . Most scholars agree, however, that gender quotas increase the number of women elected. When quotas are combined with placement mandates and effective enforcement, their effects on the election of women can be profound (Dahlerup & Freidenval, 2005; Htun & Jones, 2002; Jones, 2009) .
Recent studies have also suggested that gender quotas help to overcome the negative effect of small party magnitude on the election of women. If quota legislation also utilizes placement mandates, women candidates are more regularly nominated in winnable spots on the list. As a result, parties with a sufficiently strong quota that elect as few as two candidates could produce female candidates in the same proportion as much larger parties (Dahlerup & Freidenval, 2005; Jones, 2009; Schmidt & Saunders, 2004) . Essentially, quotas can make party size irrelevant. By the same token, gender quotas could also remove the negative effects of ethnic parties on the election of women by requiring these parties to nominate a significant number of women in electable positions. Table 1 shows that women's representation increases in the presence of gender quotas, even among ethnic parties.
9 Likewise, Table 2 shows that the differences between parties in systems with quotas and those without are statistically significant for ethnic and nonethnic parties alike. For example, ethnic parties subject to gender quotas elected 23% women on average, whereas ethnic parties without gender quotas elected only 12% women on average. Moreover, as shown in Table 2 , although there are statistically significant differences between ethnic and nonethnic parties that are not subject to gender quotas, there is little difference between ethnic and nonethnic parties under quotas. Taken together, this indicates that gender quotas could mitigate the apparent detrimental effects of ethnic parties on women's representation.
Variation Among Ethnic Parties
Finally, we anticipate important differences among ethnic parties in accordance with the type of cleavage that identifies the ethnic minority. As Okin's (1999) argument highlights, the conservative, patriarchal attitudes of some ethnic minorities may mean that parties based on religious cleavages may exclude women to a greater extent than other ethnic parties.
We find significant variation among ethnic parties in the election of women, as reported in Tables 1 and 2 . Most important, ethnic parties based on religious cleavages are the least likely of all other ethnic parties (i.e., regional, linguistic, and ethnic) to elect women. Religious parties elect fewer than 2% women on average, and 85% of religious parties elect no women at all, whereas other ethnic parties elect, on average, 17% women, and 60% of these ethnic parties completely exclude women from election. Both of these differences are statistically significant. 10 The data support Okin's (1999) concerns that protecting group rights might harm the election of women. Ethnic parties based on religious identities may elect much fewer women than other types of ethnic parties because of the more conservative ideological views of some religious groups regarding the proper status of women in politics and society.
This finding suggests that a cultural effect may be partially responsible for lower female representation in ethnic parties.
Multivariate Analyses
The results from the descriptive analysis indicate that ethnic parties tend to elect fewer women and are more likely to exclude women than other types of parties. To explore this issue in greater depth, we estimate four models to examine the impact of ethnic parties on women's representation, controlling for other factors discussed above. In Models 1a and 1b, we focus on the percentage of women elected as the dependent variable; in Models 2a and 2b, the dependent variable is a dichotomous one indicating whether the political party excludes women altogether or not (1 = no women deputies, 0 = at least one woman deputy).
In Models 1a and 2a (results in Table 3 ), the central variable of concern is a dummy variable indicating whether the party is ethnic or not. Because green parties stand out as particularly prone to electing women deputies, we also include an indicator dummy variable for these types of parties in Model 1a, but because all green parties elect at least one woman, this variable was not included in Model 2a. The final party-level variable included is party size. Party size's effect on women's representation should be nonlinear, with increases in size corresponding to an important impact up to some threshold point, at which additional increases in party size likely do not matter much. To capture this expectation, party size is measured as the natural log of the total number of deputies in a party.
The next set of variables relates to electoral rules. Of central interest, of course, is whether parties are operating in an SMD system, a PR system, or a mixed system. Thus, we include dummy variables for each electoral system, with SMD systems serving as the base category. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the party is subject to a gender quota (imposed by either the system or the party itself).
Two country-level control variables are included to account for other factors that may make parties in some countries more likely to elect women than parties in others. For example, countries with higher levels of democracy might provide more opportunities and protection for women to advance professionally and politically. To control for this, we include each country's average Freedom House score for political and civil liberties (with higher scores representing fewer freedoms). There are likely other factors that account for country-level differences in the dependent variables that we have failed to include or that are unobservable even in principle. To shield our estimates from any bias because of these potential omissions, we include an important control: the proportion of women in the national legislature of each country. This captures any national-level variation among country cases.
In addition, we level four types of interactions to capture some of our more nuanced expectations. First, we interact party size with the electoral system indicators. This reflects our expectation that party size should be most important (if not solely important) in systems with some element of PR because they use party lists. As the number of deputies elected increases, parties in such systems will go further down lists where women are more likely to appear. Second, we also interact party size with quota because the presence of a gender quota should mitigate the effects of party size. Similarly, the presence of a quota should also negate the effect of ethnic parties, so we also interact quota and ethnic party.
Finally, we interact the ethnic party indicator with the electoral system indicators. On one hand, PR electoral systems should increase women's representation, in part by centralizing nomination processes in the hands of party elites, who are expected to be more likely to nominate women than the general electorate. On the other hand, if a party is rooted in ideological or cultural characteristics not favorable to the promotion of women, these characteristics can counteract the potential positive impact of the centralized nomination procedures inherent in PR systems. Indeed, we suspect this to be the case for ethnic parties, as discussed above. These interaction terms will allow us to better test this expectation of conditionality.
Models 1b and 2b (results in Table 4 ), follow the same logic as Models 1a and 2a just described. They differ only in the respect that we have broken the political party categories into finer distinctions. More specifically, we have categorized nonethnic parties into one of the following ideological groupings: green, left, center-left, center-right, right, and other. Note that left political parties serve as the base category in these models and that the green party indicator is included only in the model of the percentage of women elected (Model 1b). To capture differences among ethnic parties, we distinguish between ethnic parties rooted in a religious cleavage and those without such a cleavage. We also include adapted interaction terms in light of this new categorization of ethnic parties.
We estimate Models 1a and 1b with generalized least squares, which allows us to estimate the standard errors of the coefficient estimates, taking account of the fact that the disturbance terms are likely correlated among party observations within a given country. We cast Models 2a and 2b in logit form and estimate them using maximum likelihood estimation, also taking account of the nonindependence of the observations at the country level in estimating the standard errors. Tables 3 and 4 present the results for Models 1a and 2a and for Models 1b and 2b, respectively.
Before considering the effects of ethnic parties, it is worth noting our findings with regard to the control variables. Level of democracy (measured by Note: PR = proportional representation. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for countrylevel clustering; constant terms are not reported here. a. All green parties have at least one woman deputy; this variable is excluded from Model 2a. *p < .10, onetailed. **p < .05, onetailed. ***p < .01, onetailed.
Freedom House scores) does not stand out as a particularly important predictor of women's representation across the four models. It is, however, consistently in the expected direction, with higher scores (fewer freedoms) corresponding to a smaller percentage of women deputies and a higher Note: PR = proportional representation. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for countrylevel clustering; constant terms are not reported here. Also, in our sample, no religious ethnic parties cooccur with mixed systems or with gender quotas. Thus, these inter actions are excluded from the model (necessarily). a. All green parties have at least one woman deputy; this variable is excluded from Model 2b. *p < .10, onetailed. **p < .05, onetailed. ***p < .01, onetailed.
likelihood of excluding women altogether. Given its dependence on other variables, the effects of party size are not directly interpretable from Tables 3  and 4 . However, additional postestimation analysis indicates that, as expected, the effect of party size is limited to PR and mixed systems but also that its estimated effect is not always distinguishable from zero even in these systems. Finally, and not surprisingly, the proportion of women in a given country's national legislature is positively related to the proportion of women within parties in that country and negatively associated with parties' odds of excluding women entirely. Given the nonlinearity of effects relating to ethnic parties, interpretation of these results is not straightforward. To ease interpretation, we present the estimated effects on the percentage of women elected (based on the estimation results for Models 1a and 1b) and the predicted probabilities of excluding women (based on the estimation results for Models 2a and 2b) in Table 5 .
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It is interesting to note some patterns across the ideological party categories in Table 5 . It is often assumed that left-leaning parties should be the most favorable to women (Norris, 1985; Rule, 1987) . Our results indicate, however, that although green parties and parties of the center-left are indeed favorable to promoting women, parties of the hard left look similar to parties of the hard right in this respect. Looking at the Model 1b estimates in Table 5 , we see that green parties and center-left parties are estimated to have about 21 and 11, respectively, percentage points more in their respective proportions of women than left parties. Likewise, although the center-left is predicted to exclude women altogether only 14% of the time in SMD systems and about 9% of the time in PR systems, the left and right parties are predicted to do so at rates greater than 41% in SMD systems and greater than 28% in PR systems.
Moving to ethnic parties, we can see that the results largely support our contention that the centralization of the nomination process under PR can lead to the marginalization of women in ethnic parties. Consider the Model 1a and 2a estimates for ethnic parties not subject to quotas. Looking at the effects on the percentage of women elected in Table 5 , ethnic parties have a slight negative effect of about two points. Although this effect is not statistically significant, note that this is in comparison to parties on the left, which, as discussed above, we also find to be unfavorable to women. The predicted probabilities for Model 2a are clearer. The predicted probability of excluding women is greater than 50% among ethnic parties, compared to a rate of about 18% among nonethnic parties in PR systems when a quota is not present.
Furthermore, it seems that religious ethnic parties are the driving force behind ethnic parties' tendency to underrepresent women. Again, consider parties in PR systems without quota restrictions, now focusing on Models 1b and 2b. Under such conditions, religious parties are predicted to exclude women at Note: SMD = singlemember district; PR = proportional representation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Only one effect is reported for the nonethnic parties in Models 1a and 1b be cause the effects for these parties are cast in linear form whereas the effects of ethnic parties are modeled to depend on both the electoral system and gender quotas (see Note 10). a. In our sample, no religious parties are subject to quotas and none are in mixed systems. *p < .10, onetailed. **p < .05, onetailed. ***p < .01, onetailed.
a rate of 88% whereas other ethnic parties have a predicted probability of only about 24%. To put these in perspective, the other types of parties' predicted probabilities range from a low of about 9% for the center-left to a high of about 29%. Likewise, the estimated effect of religious parties on the percentage of women elected is, on average, about 9 percentage points below the average percentage for left parties (and the difference is statistically significant beyond the .01 level), whereas the effect for other ethnic parties is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In short, religious ethnic parties underrepresent women, but nonreligious ethnic parties behave like nonethnic parties. These patterns of low representation for women in ethnic parties-and in religious parties in particular-appear to be limited to parties in PR systems that are not subject to gender quotas. Indeed, a quick glance at the predicted probabilities in Table 5 shows that mixed systems seem rather friendly to the inclusion of women across all party types (and regardless of quota restrictions). Furthermore, the findings for SMD systems are in stark contrast to those for PR systems. In SMD systems without quotas, for example, ethnic and nonethnic parties are both predicted to exclude women at a rate of about 26%, and religious parties do not stand out as particularly exclusionary. Finally, it is worth noting that gender quotas appear to work in the expected fashion, negating some of the effects of ethnic parties. The predicted probability of excluding women decreases under gender quotas for every type of party in all electoral systems, and ethnic parties are no exception.
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Conclusion
Scholars studying intersectionality have long suggested that tension may exist in attempts to promote the election of historically marginalized groups at the same time but have provided little systematic evidence to back up these claims. We also know very little about why the election of women and ethnic minorities may come into conflict or whether these tensions are mitigated by other factors such as electoral systems, gender quotas, or party size. This study makes an important step toward filling these gaps. A central conclusion of this study is that the impact of ethnic parties on the election of women is conditional on both institutional and cultural factors. Three specific findings stand out from our analyses.
First, our study provides mixed results about the general impact of ethnic parties on women's representation once we control for other factors. On one hand, ethnic parties do not appear to elect a lower percentage of women than nonethnic parties, and in SMD elections they actually elect more women than their nonethnic counterparts (see Table 5 ). On the other hand, ethnic parties do seem to exclude women from elected office at higher rates than do nonethnic parties, but only under specific conditions, namely, PR elections that do not involve gender quotas.
Second, not all ethnic parties are the same in their tendency to elect (or exclude) women. Indeed, where ethnic parties perform poorly (i.e., in PR systems), religious ethnic parties stand out as exceptionally exclusionary and as having particularly low percentages of women elected. Indeed, nonreligious ethnic parties did not have particularly low percentages of women deputies, nor did they tend to completely exclude women at higher rates than nonethnic parties.
Third, we have shown that, contrary to common assumptions, PR elections provide a context conducive to the underrepresentation of women among ethnic parties. Religious parties elected a lower percentage of women and excluded women at higher rates than both nonreligious ethnic parties and nonethnic parties only in PR elections. The difference fades away in SMD elections. We attribute this finding to the fact that PR tends to centralize nomination decisions in the party elite and surmise that the party elites of ethnic parties and religious parties, in particular, tend to be patriarchal and thus harmful to the election of women. This hypothesis remains speculative, however, and deserves further investigation. In addition, the finding that SMD systems appear rather conducive to women's representation even among ethnic parties is surprising and merits future study as well.
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5. Party size should be much less consequential in elections with single-member districts because such elections involve contests with only one winner. Even very large parties that send many representatives to the legislature win each of their seats in separate contests. Although not impossible, gender balancing in such an environment is more difficult and less in demand. 6. It is important to note that the size of the party per se is not as important as party magnitude-the number of seats a party fills in each district. The more seats that a party fills within a given district, the greater the likelihood that party will reach female candidates on its list (Matland, 1993; Matland & Taylor, 1997; Rule, 1987) . To go far down the party list where more women are expected to occupy positions, a party must not only win many seats but also win a critical mass of seats within particular districts. However, we did not have the data to calculate party magnitude and thus used party size as a proxy. 7. When we control for party size in our multivariate analyses, we use the log of party size to capture the diminishing effect of party size as parties get bigger. The impact of a change from one to two or three to four deputies is expected to have a much greater impact on the election of women than the change from 49 to 50 or 100 to 101 deputies. We also include an interaction term, party size × ethnic party, to test our hypothesis that party size will affect women's representation in nonethnic parties but not necessarily in ethnic parties. 8. In our multivariate analyses, we include the interaction term, ethnic party × electoral system, to capture the interactive effect that electoral rules and ethnic parties seem to have on women's representation. 9. We coded both legislative gender quotas applying to all parties and gender quotas adopted by single parties in our data set. It should be noted, however, that ethnic parties are less likely to adopt party-based gender quotas. Although 28 ethnic parties were subject to a national legislative gender quota, no ethnic party in our study had gender quotas at the party level, whereas 16% of nonethnic parties had party quotas. 10. Given the similarity in patterns of representation among nonreligious ethnic parties, we combine the three subcategories of regional, linguistic, and ethnic parties into one category, nonreligious, from here on. 11. The reader should note a few things about this table. First, the information is broken down by the type of electoral system and by whether parties are subject to gender quotas. The reader will note, however, that only one effect is reported for the nonethnic party categories in Models 1a and 1b. This is because the effects for nonethnic parties are cast in linear form whereas the effects of ethnic parties are modeled to depend on both the electoral system and gender quotas. Being cast in logit form, Models 2a and 2b are inherently nonlinear in the parameters, making all effects dependent on others. Thus, even nonethnic parties have predicted probabilities specific to the electoral system and quotas. Second, the reported effects for Models 1a and 1b are essentially the average difference in the percentage of women elected for the target party type in comparison to a base category. In the case of Model 1a, the base is nonethnic, nongreen parties; for Model 1b, the base is left parties. 12. The fact that we also found ethnic parties to be highly resistant to party-based quotas suggests a certain limitation to the power of gender quotas to mitigate the effect of ethnic parties on women's representation. Such quotas are likely to come only from national-level quota initiatives.
